Firm-Size Wage Gaps Along the Formal-Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

BETAM WORKING PAPER SERIES #012
SEPTEMBER 2013
Firm-Size Wage Gaps along the Formal-Informal Divide: Theory and Evidence

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September 10, 2013

Abstract

Observationally equivalent workers are paid higher wages in larger firms. This fact is often named as the “firm-size wage gap” and is regarded as a key empirical puzzle. Using a nationally representative micro-level survey data from Turkey, this paper documents a new stylized fact: the firm-size wage gap is more pronounced for informal (unregistered) jobs than for formal (registered) jobs. To explain this fact, we develop a two-stage wage-posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets, the solution to which produces wages as a function of firm size in a well-defined subgame-perfect equilibrium. The model proposes two distinct mechanisms. First, setting high tax rates on formal activity generates a wedge between formal and informal size wage gaps. Thus, government policy can potentially affect the magnitude of the firm-size wage gaps. We provide auxiliary empirical evidence justifying this finding. The model is able to explain the stylized fact through a second mechanism—even when the tax dimension is shut down. Higher wages offered by a larger firm for a formal job can attract a larger number of applicants, than the same amount offered by the same firm can attract for an informal job. The larger pool of applicants for the formal job, in turn, enables the firm to keep the size differentials modest, while this mitigating effect is weaker for informal jobs.

JEL codes: C78, J21, J31.

Keywords: Firm size; wage gap; informal employment; wage posting; subgame perfection; taxes.

*We thank Daron Acemoglu, Kerem Cosar, Hakan Ercan, seminar participants at the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, the participants of the Turkish Economic Association Workshop on Economic Statistics in Ankara, and BETAM/World Bank Labor Market Network Meeting in Istanbul for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed here are of our own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey. All errors are ours.

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1 Introduction

It is well-documented in the literature that larger firms pay higher wages to observationally equivalent workers than smaller firms pay.\(^1\) This fact holds almost invariably across countries and sectors as well as across jobs with different supervisory responsibilities.\(^2\) Several explanations are offered in the literature ranging from unobserved worker heterogeneity [Idson and Feaster (1990)] to unobserved firm productivity [Idson and Oi (1999)] and from the need for better data [Troske (1999)] to firm-level differences in labor turnover due to differences in hiring and human resource management practices [Idson (1996)]. Still, the firm-size wage gap is regarded as one of the key empirical challenges in labor economics and additional research is called for to enhance our theoretical understanding of this empirical phenomenon.

In this paper, we document a new fact: the firm-size wage gap is higher for informal jobs than formal jobs. We perform our empirical analysis using a nationally-representative micro-level dataset from Turkey, which we believe that is a good laboratory to study this question—since more than 25 percent of all jobs are informal as of the 2010-2011 period in Turkey based on official figures. “Size” corresponds to the number of workers employed in a particular firm. The data allows us to define firm size in 6 categories, 1 being the smallest and 6 being the largest. After controlling for a comprehensive set of observed covariates, we find that the wage gap between the firms of the largest versus the smallest size is around 19 percent and 34 percent for formal and informal jobs, respectively. Moreover, this difference increases monotonically as size increases from 1 to 6; that is, when we consider wages as a function of size, our finding means that the slope of this function is steeper for informal jobs than formal jobs.

Then comes the question: is it possible to develop a coherent theoretical framework to understand the forces driving this result? We construct a two-stage wage-posting game with market imperfections and segmented markets. The solution of this game analytically char-

\(^1\)See Oi and Idson (1999) for a comprehensive review of the early literature. Breakthrough papers in the early literature that deserve attention include Mellow (1982), Brown and Medoff (1989), and Groshen (1991).

characterizes wages as a function of firm size within a well-defined subgame-perfect equilibrium. Firms differ in size, but workers are homogeneous. Each firm posts a wage, workers observe all offers and device a symmetric application strategy. Large firms offer higher wages, because the vacancies posted by them are more valuable—as larger firms are more productive. This framework proposes two mechanisms as potential explanations for the new stylized fact we report. First, formal jobs are subject to taxes and informal jobs are not. Taxes impose a wedge between the size premium in informal jobs versus that in formal jobs. The model is able to propose a second explanation even when the taxes are shut down. A large firm faces a key tradeoff. It has to post a high enough wage so as to guarantee that the productive position is filled. There is also a secondary mitigating effect. The firm also has to keep wages at reasonable levels, because higher wages will attract a lot of applicants, the extent of which will provide incentives to keep the wage offer somewhat lower (as the vacancy will be filled anyway with that many applicants). We argue that the high-wage informal jobs posted by larger firms does not receive that many applications; so, the secondary (mitigating) force is weak for those jobs. As a result, the size gradient of the wage function is steeper for informal jobs than formal jobs. The key point is that the mitigating force is weaker for informal jobs.

We discuss in Section 3.2 that large firms have incentives to post informal jobs and a small fraction of skilled workers have incentives to apply for these positions in the Turkish labor market. We argue that the relative attractiveness of a high-pay informal job is lower than a high-pay formal job and the result follows.

These results have several implications for the more general issue: what determines the size-wage gap? Our first mechanism suggests that the size-wage gap is lower for formal jobs than informal jobs, because formal jobs are more costly to the employer due to taxes. To convert this hypothesis into a testable one, we restate this conclusion as follows: the size-wage gap is a decreasing function of taxes. After combining the cross-state tax differentials in the U.S. with the cross-state size-gap we estimate from the Current Population Survey (CPS) March Supplements, we find that the states with higher state-level employer tax burden have lower size wage-gaps in the U.S. This is in line with our theoretical finding. We conclude that
government policy may affect the magnitude of the firm-size wage premium. The second mechanism suggests that the size-wage gap is potentially related to the hiring strategy of the firms. The characteristics of the posted vacancy, the number of applications that specific vacancy is expected to receive, and the response of the firm to the expected size of the applicant pool are offered as the joint determinants of the size-wage gaps.

Our theoretical model is similar to the wage-posting models of Montgomery (1991), Lang (1991), and Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005). In line with these papers, we solve a two-stage wage-posting game in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Different from them, we incorporate two pieces: (i) firms differ in size and (ii) the number of applicants for each position is an indirect function of firm size. Other than these two major differences, we adopt the idea that formal and informal jobs are posted in segmented markets. In this respect, our model is related to the dual labor markets literature arguing that informal and formal jobs are subject to market segmentation at least partially [see, for example, Stiglitz (1976), Dickens and Lang (1985), and Heckman and Hotz (1986)].

This paper makes several contributions to the literature on the firm-size wage gaps. To start with, this is the first paper in the literature documenting that the firm-size wage gaps differ across informal and formal jobs. Around 25 percent of the working population in Turkey are employed in informal jobs; thus, the Turkish data offers a natural laboratory to investigate the differences in firm-size wage gap patterns between formal and informal jobs. Second, we develop a theoretical model to explain this phenomenon. One of the predictions of the model is that the firm-size wage gap is negatively related to the tax burden of formal jobs. In other words, the employers’ tax burden is a potential determinant of the magnitude of the firm-size wage gaps. We confirm the validity of this predictions using state-level labor tax differences in the U.S. Finally, we argue—as the second prediction of our model—that the number of new applicants that an incremental increase in the wage offer will attract is smaller in informal jobs. This, itself, can explain the fact we document.

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3See Magnac (1991) for an opposing view.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides summary statistics for our micro-
level data from Turkey and presents the results of our empirical investigation. Section 3
constructs the benchmark model, solves it, assesses its main predictions, discusses potential
policy implications, and performs additional empirical tests of the model with the U.S. data.
Section 4 concludes.

2 Data and Facts

2.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics

We use the Turkish Household Labor Force Survey (THLFS) data collected and compiled
by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT). It is a large, micro-level, survey-based,
publicly-available, and nationally-representative dataset based on which the official unem-
ployment and earnings figures have been calculated and published regularly. The micro-level
data details are publicly available only with yearly frequency, so we use yearly data from 2010
and 2011. The sample we focus on consists of employed individuals of working age in the
private sector.\footnote{We drop public sector workers, because job rank and pay are mostly determined by law.} The wage variable describes monthly wage earnings in the main job and it
is deflated using the GDP deflator with 2010 being the base year. We also control for 27
occupation and 87 industry categories classified based on the standardized NACE Rev.2 rules.
Moreover, we include 12 regional dummy variables—at the NUTS1 level—to capture potential
regional variations in the firm-size wage gap patterns.

Our key variable, firm size, is defined \textit{via} 6 dummy variables. We name these variables from
Size 1 through Size 6, the latter being the largest firm. The Size 1 firm is a firm with the
number of employees in the interval 1–10, Size 2 is 11–24, Size 3 is 25–49, Size 4 is 50–249,
Size 5 is 250–499, and, finally, Size 6 is 500 and above. We focus on workers of age 15 to 64.
In the dataset, worker age is reported in 5 year intervals from 15–19 to 60–64. Accordingly, we
construct 10 age dummies to capture the age effects. Education is represented by 6 dummy
variables as follows: no degree, primary school, secondary school, high school, vocational
high school, and college & above. We control for workers’ tenure in their current position
Turkish Household Labor Force Survey data for years 2010 and 2011 are used in the analysis. Wages are deflated taking 2010 as the base year. The first two columns describe the summary statistics for formal employment and the last two columns describe those for informal employment. Appropriate frequency weights are used in all calculations.

We also construct dummy variables for gender, marital status, urban/rural status, and full-time/part-time job status. A specific feature of the Turkish labor market is that a non-negligible fraction of workers (around 27.5 percent) are employed informally. This does not necessarily mean that they are employed by informal firms. Formal firms also offer informal employment opportunities. Section 3.2 provides a detailed discussion of this issue, which will help understanding the predictions of our theoretical model developed in Section 3.1. Table (1) reports the summary statistics for formal and informal employment separately.

In our unweighted sample, we have 135,153 observations—95,665 of them are employed in formal jobs and 39,488 of them are employed informally. (Summary statistics for 87 industry

Table 1: **Summary Statistics:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Formal</th>
<th>Informal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std.Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 1</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>0.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 2</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 3</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 4</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 5</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 6</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.784</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.674</td>
<td>0.469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>0.989</td>
<td>0.103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Degree</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>0.385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational High School</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College &amp; Above</td>
<td>0.179</td>
<td>0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 15–19</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 20–24</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 25–29</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 30–34</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 35–39</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 40–44</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 45–49</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 50–54</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 55–59</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 60–64</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure in last job (weeks)</td>
<td>243.916</td>
<td>273.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Wages</td>
<td>1058.192</td>
<td>884.393</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sample share | 0.726 | 0.274 

# of Observations | 95,665 | 39,488

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6
Table 2: **Estimation Results.** Size 1, female, non-married, part-time, and no degree categories are the ignored dummy variables; so, the coefficients are interpreted relative to these categories. The year dummy controls for the year 2010 (and 2011 is ignored). Age dummies include dummy variables for the age categories 15–19, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44, 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60–64. Appropriate sampling weights are used in all calculations.

categories, 27 occupation categories, and 12 regions are not reported but are controlled for in our regressions.) Relevant frequency weights are used to construct the summary statistics and in the regressions.

### 2.2 Empirical Analysis and Results

In this section, we run a least squares regression of log monthly wages on control variables for gender, marital status, age groups, education categories, tenure in last job (as a quadratic), urban/rural employment, firm size, full-time/part-time work status as well as year, region, industry, and occupation dummies. So, we control for all the relevant individual-level, group-level, and job-specific characteristics. Separate regressions are estimated for formal and informal employment. Table (2) presents our estimates. According to our estimates, the wage gap

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Size 2</td>
<td>0.048***</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.138***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 3</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 4</td>
<td>0.090***</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 5</td>
<td>0.132***</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.266***</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size 6</td>
<td>0.194***</td>
<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.341***</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>0.102***</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.195***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>0.075***</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.057***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>0.029***</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
<td>0.020***</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full-time</td>
<td>0.560***</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.648***</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>0.049***</td>
<td>0.0005</td>
<td>0.022***</td>
<td>0.0007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>0.103***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.065***</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational High School</td>
<td>0.115***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.067***</td>
<td>0.0009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College &amp; Above</td>
<td>0.289***</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
<td>0.0003***</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure^2</td>
<td>-3.53 × 10^{-6}***</td>
<td>9.71 × 10^{-8}</td>
<td>-7.73 × 10^{-6}***</td>
<td>1.62 × 10^{-7}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Dummy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Dummies</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Observations</td>
<td>95,665</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,488</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R^2</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
between smallest and largest firms is 19.4 percent in formal employment, whereas it goes up
to 34.1 percent in informal employment. Moreover, this difference increases monotonically as
size increases from 1 to 6; that is, when we consider wages as a function of size, our finding
means that the slope of this function is steeper for informal jobs than formal jobs.

Figure (2.1) provides a plot of our estimates for formal versus informal employment. The
left panel is for the coefficients and the right panel is for the gap itself. It is clear that the
firm-size wage gap has a different slope along the formal-informal divide. To be specific, the
size wage gap is larger for informal employment than formal employment. To demonstrate
this finding more clearly, we plot red dashed lines, which are just simple trend lines indicating
that the wages increase faster with respect to size for informal employment than it does for
formal employment. In the next section, we provide theoretical explanations for this empirical
observation and discuss the underlying economic forces.

3 Theoretical Framework

In this section, we construct a theoretical model to explain/justify the empirical facts docu-
mented in the previous section. Our main purpose in this section is to theoretically identify
the factors that can potentially lead to a larger size wage gap for informal employment than
formal employment. We first develop a general framework that will serve as a benchmark
model in our theoretical analysis. Then, we show how one can use this benchmark framework
in understanding the differences in the observed firm-size wage gap patterns along the formal-
informal divide. To be precise, we identify two potential channels. The first one argues that these differences can be attributed to government policies; that is, high taxes on formal employment may be generating a wedge between size wage gaps in the formal and informal jobs. This result implies a more general hypothesis: there is a negative relationship between the firm-size wage gap and the employment taxes. We use state-level microeconomic data from the U.S. to test the validity of this “implied” hypothesis. Second, we show that relatively lower demand for high-pay informal jobs (than high-pay formal jobs) can lead to a higher size wage gap for informal employment than formal employment.

3.1 A Wage-Posting Game

The model draws on the simple wage-posting game developed by Montgomery (1991), Lang (1991), and Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005). Workers are homogeneous, i.e., they are equally productive; so, firms do not make any distinctions/discrimination among them. Firms, on the other hand, are heterogeneous. These assumptions are consistent with the empirical analysis conducted in Section 2. Our regressions control for all observed worker characteristics, but we do not have much information about firm characteristics. All we know is the size of the firm that the worker is employed.\(^5\) There is an extensive literature empirically documenting the fact that firm size and productivity are strongly positively correlated. For example, Simon and Bonini (1958), Axtell (2001), and Luttmer (2007) show that the firm-size distribution is of the Pareto form, which suggests that firms on the right tail (i.e., larger firms) are scarce. This scarcity is due to the fact that they are, on average, more productive than the smaller firms. Let \(N\) denote the size of a firm and \(z\) is the productivity. We assume that (1) firms differ in their sizes \(N\) and (2) productivity \(z\) and size \(N\) are related via a continuously increasing and invertible function \(g\), i.e., \(z = g(N)\) with \(g'(\cdot) > 0\).

Each firm has one vacant position. Vacancies come with a posted wage. Workers have perfect information on all posted wage offers and, given this menu of wages, they choose which firm to apply. Each worker can apply for only one position. Workers know that higher wage offers will

\(^5\)Throughout this section, “size” of a firm refers to the total number of workers employed by the firm.
attract more applicants, which means that the probability of getting accepted will be smaller when the posted wage is high. Vacancy creation and wage posting are simultaneous events; thus, firms do not know the exact number of applicants when they choose a posted wage offer. They, instead, form expectations on the number of applicants. Firms hope to attract at least one applicant, because not being able to fill the position will be costly. In forming expectations on the number of applicants they will receive, the firms act on the information that higher wage offers will increase the expected number of applicants, which means that the probability of ending up with an unfilled vacancy will be lower.

The equilibrium will be calculated within a two-stage game in this model. At the first stage, firms simultaneously post wage offers. At the second stage, workers observe all of the posted wages and they simultaneously decide which job to apply. Firms’ wage posting strategy will be a best response to the expected worker behavior and workers’ application strategy will be a best response to the observed wage offers. The resulting equilibrium will be subgame perfect. However, this will not be a standard subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. The reason is that, in Nash equilibrium, agents know that their own actions will generate a response in market prices. In the present model, workers are small (i.e., they are price takers) and their actions will not affect market prices in any sense, because firms will act on “expected” number of applications rather than the actual numbers. Thus, following Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), we call our equilibrium a subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium.

There is a large (finite) number \( L \) of firms and the total number of job applicants in the job market is a random variable \( X \), with mean \( \mu_x \). The realization of \( X \) is not observed by the firm; however, the firm knows and acts on \( \mu_x \). We assume that applicants come from a large population of workers, who make independent and equally probable decisions to enter the labor market. This definition implies that the total number of applicants, \( X \), is Poisson distributed. We also assume that firms are able to commit to their equilibrium strategies, i.e., they will not change their posted wages after seeing the realization of \( X \). In this setting, the firm will not hire anyone if it receives no applications; it will hire one worker at random if it receives more than one applications; and it will hire the sole applicant if it receives one and
only one application.

Let \( j \) index the hiring firms. In this setup, posted wage offers can be represented by a vector \( \mathbf{w} \) with firm-specific entries \( w_j \)'s. Workers observe the wage profile \( \mathbf{w} \) and develop a mixed strategy \( \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{w}) \), taken the wage offers as given. \( \mathbf{h}(\mathbf{w}) \) is a vector of application probabilities with entries \( h_j(\mathbf{w}) \), which describes the probability of applying to firm \( j \) given the entire wage offer profile \( \mathbf{w} \). Workers are identical, so the strategy that they adopt is symmetric. As a result, the number of job applicants for any given firm \( j \) is drawn from a Poisson distribution with mean \( \mu_j \), which can be formulated as

\[
\mu_j = h_j(\mathbf{w})\mu_x. \tag{3.1}
\]

In other words, \( \mu_j \) is the number of job applicants that firm \( j \) expects or hopes to attract, while \( \mu_x \) is the expected number of total applicants in the job market. Then, firm \( j \)'s expected profits can be expressed as

\[
\pi_j = (1 - e^{-\mu_j})[g(N_j) - w_j], \tag{3.2}
\]

where \( g(N_j) \) is the value of a filled job’s output as a function of firm size and \( 1 - e^{-\mu_j} \) is the probability that the vacancy is filled.\(^6\) Now we are ready to describe the worker behavior, firm behavior, and the resulting subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium.

### 3.1.1 Job Application Strategy

In this subsection, we will describe the unique symmetric equilibrium in the worker application subgame. Let \( f(\mu_j) \) describe the hiring strategy of firm \( j \) who expects to receive \( \mu_j \) applications with a posted wage \( w_j \). More specifically, \( f(\mu_j) \) is the probability that an additional designated applicant will be hired by firm \( j \). We will describe how \( f(\mu_j) \) is formulated in Section 3.1.2. Based on this definition, the expected income that any worker will receive by

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\(^6\)As a property of the Poisson distribution, \( e^{-\mu_j} \) is the probability that the firm receives no applications, given that the Poisson arrival rate is \( \mu_j \). Then \( 1 - e^{-\mu_j} \) is the probability that firm \( j \) receives at least one application. By the firm’s hiring strategy described above, we know that the firm will definitely choose to hire if it receives at least one applications. As a result, \( 1 - e^{-\mu_j} \) is the probability that the vacancy is filled.
applying to firm \( j \), which we denote with \( M_j \), is simply

\[
M_j = w_j f(\mu_j). 
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.3)

Given that all workers observe the entire profile of wage offers \( w \) and they observe \( f(\mu_j) \)'s, they construct a menu (or vector) \( M \) of expected incomes from all applications. Let \( M = \max_j M_j \) is the maximum of all expected incomes. Workers will only apply to those firms with \( M_j = M \). Following the terminology introduced by Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), we call \( M \) the “market expected income.” So, in any symmetric equilibrium for the worker-application subgame, we have

\[
M_j = \begin{cases} 
M, & \text{for } w_j \geq M, \\
w_j, & \text{for } w_j < M,
\end{cases}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.4)

which suggests the following: (i) if the posted wage is less than the market expected income, then no worker will apply to such a firm; and (ii) if the posted wage offer is greater than or equal to the market expected income, then the firm will receive at least one application and the number of applications that the firm receives in the equilibrium will drive \( M_j \) down until \( M_j = M \) is reached. This can be expressed as follows:

\[
\begin{cases} 
\mu_j > 0, & \text{for } w_j \geq M, \\
\mu_j = 0, & \text{for } w_j < M.
\end{cases}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.5)

Using (3.3) and (3.5), and assuming that \( f \) is invertible, it is possible to solve for \( \mu_j \), when \( w_j \geq M \), as follows:

\[
\mu_j = f^{-1}(M/w_j). 
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.6)

The total expected number of job applicants is

\[
\sum_j \mu_j = \mu_x = \sum_{j \mid w_j \geq M} f^{-1}(M/w_j). 
\]  \hspace{1cm} (3.7)
Equation (3.7) can be used to determine the equilibrium value of $M$. The left-hand size is a constant and the right-hand side is a decreasing function of $M$. As a result, we obtain a unique equilibrium solution for $M$, which we denote with $M^*(w)$. Then, $M^*(w)$, Equation (3.6), and Equation (3.1) jointly define the unique symmetric equilibrium $h^*(w)$ in the worker application subgame with posted wage offers $w$, given that firms are behaving optimally. This completes the characterization of the worker’s application strategy.

### 3.1.2 Hiring Strategy

Let the profile of posted wages be $w$. There is a potential pool of applicants for firm $j$. Since these applicants are identical, each of them has the same probability of applying to firm $j$. As we discuss above, $\mu_j$ is the number of workers that the firm expects to receive an application. Suppose now that an additional worker applies to firm $j$. The probability that this additional designated applicant will be hired is

$$f(\mu_j) = \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \frac{1}{k+1} \frac{e^{-\mu_j} \mu_j^k}{k!}.$$  (3.8)

After some algebra, it is possible to represent this probability simply as

$$f(\mu_j) = \begin{cases} 
1, & \text{for } \mu_j = 0, \\
(1 - e^{-\mu_j})/\mu_j, & \text{for } \mu_j > 0. 
\end{cases} \quad (3.9)$$

In words, when the expected number of applicants to firm $j$ is zero, then the designated applicant will be hired with probability 1. If, on the other hand, the expected number of applicants is strictly greater than zero, then the probability that an additional applicant will be hired is strictly less than 1 and is a function of the expected number of applicants.

### 3.1.3 The Subgame-Perfect Competitive Equilibrium

The game between firms and workers yields a subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium described by the pair of behavioral profiles $\{w^*, h(\cdot)\}$. In this equilibrium, the mixed strategy $h^*(\cdot)$ is symmetric across workers given a wage profile $w^*$. From Equation (3.6), we know that
Substituting this expression into firm’s expected profit function given by Equation (3.2) and using firm’s hiring strategy given in Equation (3.9), we find

\[ \pi_j = (1 - e^{-\mu_j}) g(N_j) - M^*(w) \mu_j. \] (3.10)

The firm takes workers’ application strategy \( M^*(w) \) as given and maximizes the expected profits over the expected number of applicants \( \mu_j \). The first-order condition for this maximization problem is simply

\[ \mu_j = \log \left( \frac{g(N_j)}{M^*(w)} \right). \] (3.11)

Manipulating Equation (3.11) yields the expression

\[ M^*(w) = g(N_j) e^{-\mu_j}. \] (3.12)

The equilibrium operating profit of each firm then becomes

\[ \pi_j = \left[ 1 - (1 + \mu_j) e^{-\mu_j} \right] g(N_j) \] (3.13)

and the equilibrium posted wage for each firm \( j \) becomes

\[ w_j = \frac{g(N_j) \mu_j}{e^{\mu_j} - 1}. \] (3.14)

Equation (3.14) is the core result in this section. It formulates posted wages as a function of two objects: (1) the value or productivity of a vacancy, \( g(\cdot) \), which itself is a function of firm size, \( N_j \) and (2) the expected number of applicants to the position posted by firm \( j \). This formula suggests that larger firms pay higher wages, because they are more productive and they expects to receive a larger number of applicants per vacant position.

To map this formulation to our empirical analysis, we differentiate wages with respect to size, which will give us how wage offers change as a response to an incremental increase in firm size. Note that the expected number of applicants will also be affected in this differential system.
Thus, to get the full response, we totally differentiate Equation (3.14) with respect to $w_j$, $N_j$, and $\mu_j$, which, after some algebra, gives the following expression:

$$\frac{dw_j}{dN_j} = \frac{g'(N_j)\mu_j}{e^{\mu_j} - 1} + \frac{g(N_j)}{e^{\mu_j} - 1} \left[ 1 - \frac{\mu_j e^{\mu_j}}{e^{\mu_j} - 1} \right] \frac{d\mu_j}{dN_j} > 0. \quad (3.15)$$

This formula can be interpreted as follows. There is a consensus in the literature that larger firms pay higher wages to observationally equivalent workers. This is our observation also for Turkey. (See our estimates given in Table (2).) This fact is reflected above as $\frac{dw_j}{dN_j} > 0$.

$\frac{dw_j}{dN_j}$ has two components. The first component $\frac{g'(N_j)\mu_j}{e^{\mu_j} - 1} > 0$ says that larger firms pay higher wages because they are more productive. The sign of the second term is negative because the term $1 - \frac{\mu_j e^{\mu_j}}{e^{\mu_j} - 1}$ is less than or equal to zero for $\mu_j \geq 0$. Based on the mechanism we describe, we also know that $\frac{d\mu_j}{dN_j} > 0$; that is, larger firms expect to attract a greater number of applicants, everything else is constant. This greater pool of applicants, however, generates a secondary effect: the effect of size on wages will be mitigated by the fact that, with such a large applicant pool, the firm can easily fill its vacancy without the need to pay a large size premium.

To summarize, our model suggests that the effect of size on wages operates through two channels: the productivity effect and the labor supply effect. The productivity effect makes a positive contribution, while the labor supply effect makes a negative contribution to the magnitude of $\frac{dw_j}{dN_j}$. But, in the overall, empirical evidence suggests that the productivity effect dominates and the sign of $\frac{dw_j}{dN_j}$ remains positive. In the next subsection, we will extend this mechanism by assuming segmented markets and, then, use this benchmark model to explain the stylized fact we document in Section 2.

### 3.2 Firm-Size Wage Gap in Segmented Markets

From this point on, we assume that markets are segmented, i.e., formal and informal jobs are posted in separate markets. Before discussing the predictions of our model regarding the differences in firm-size wage gaps in formal and informal jobs, below we motivate our “segmented markets” assumption. This assumption is empirically justified and is often invoked...
in theoretical work. In particular, influential papers including Dickens and Lang (1985) and Heckman and Hotz (1986) segmented markets along the formal/informal divide exist in the real world. Following this tradition, we assume that there is such a segmentation in our theoretical environment. This means that the supply and demand conditions underlying the equilibrium solution are different for formal and informal jobs.

There are several reasons to believe that formal/informal segmentation is a realistic assumption for the labor markets in Turkey. First, the social security system in Turkey provides reasonable health and social insurance arrangements even for those who do not have any kind of official social security coverage. There are a lot of individuals aligned on this margin, who are willing to accept higher informal wages in exchange for better coverage in a lower-paying formal job. Second, the coverage provided by formal jobs is so generous that the spouses—in particular, wives who do not have a social security registration through a formal job—are also fully covered. This provides incentives for these spouses to work in informal jobs under more flexible terms. They are mostly not interested in the formal job market. Finally, firms also have incentives to create informal employment due to cost considerations. Taxes, social security contributions, and job security arrangements sum up to an important amount and can sometimes induce firms, especially the small ones, to search for workers in the informal market.

In the rest of this section, we present the detailed predictions of the benchmark model developed above by assuming that labor markets are segmented along the formal/informal divide, firms post separate job openings in formal and informal job markets, and workers’ preferences toward jobs also support this segmentation. The predictions of the model are twofold. First, the model predicts (as we discuss in Section 3.2.1) that setting high tax rates on formal employment inserts a wedge between the firm-size wage gaps for formal and informal jobs. Second, and finally, high-paying informal jobs attract a smaller number of applicants than the high-paying formal jobs do. We discuss below in greater detail the theoretical predictions, our interpretations of them, and additional/auxiliary empirical evidence to check the validity of those predictions.
3.2.1 The Role of Taxes

An important difference between formal and informal jobs is that formal jobs are more costly tax-wise for both the employer and employee. For this reason, informal jobs are often associated with tax avoidance behavior. Taxes are dropped from the formulas in the previous subsection for expositional simplicity. Below we make the tax rate visible and discuss how taxes affect behavior in our model.

Suppose formal and informal jobs are offered in segmented markets, but the only difference between these two markets is that those working in formal jobs pay taxes while the informal workers do not. This suggests that the Equation (3.14) becomes

\[ w_j = g(N_j)\mu_j \left(1 + \tau \right) \left(e^{\mu_j} - 1 \right), \]

(3.16)

where \( \tau \in (0, 1) \) is the tax burden on the formal job. The informal job sets \( \tau = 0 \), while for the formal job \( \tau > 0 \). So, it is also possible to re-label formal and informal jobs as high-tax and low-tax jobs, respectively. Using (3.15) and (3.16), it is clear that

\[ \frac{d^2 w_j}{dN_j d\tau} < 0, \]

(3.17)

which means that the size gap is a decreasing function of taxes. In other words, the size-gradient of wages becomes smaller as the tax rate goes up. This formulation predicts that the size-wage gap should be higher for informal jobs than formal jobs. Taxes impose a wedge between the firm-size wage gaps in formal and informal jobs. However, this prediction does not only apply to jobs along the formal/informal divide and it can be translated into a more general one: firm-size wage gaps is a decreasing function of employment taxes. So, if we have, say, cross-regional data on firm-size wage gaps and employment taxes, then our prediction suggests that we should observe lower firm-size wage gaps in low-tax regions. Next we formally test this prediction.

To be specific, we convert our theoretical prediction into an empirically testable one by making
the following statement: if the tax rate is a relevant factor affecting the firm-size wage gaps, then it has to be the case that the firm-size wage gap should be lower in regions with higher taxes on labor. We perform this test using data from the United States by utilizing the labor tax differentials across the states.

We use the Current Population Survey (CPS) March supplements from 2010 and 2011 to estimate the firm-size wage gaps for each state in our data set. We regress monthly log wages for full-time full-year workers employed by the firms in the private sector on gender, education, race, age (quadratic), marital status, occupation, industry, and firm size. The firm size is defined by a dummy variable taking 1 if the worker is employed by a firm with greater than 500 employees and taking 0 otherwise. We perform a separate regression for each of the states in our sample. To avoid the possible spurious size effects coming from unusual industry concentrations in smaller states, we focus on the 15 largest states in terms of their Gross Domestic Products. These states are California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.

The Federal taxes are fixed, but the state-level labor taxes exhibit significant variation across the states. The state-specific tax burden is calculated from the state-level labor tax information provided by the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration. We multiply the maximum applicable salary reported with the corresponding tax rates to calculate the “maximum possible burdens” on employers in each state. This maximum burden is usually the regular burden for most of the states because the maximum applicable salary is fairly low for the average full-time full-year worker in the U.S.

We find a clear negative relationship between the labor tax rates and the firm-size wage gaps at the state level in the U.S. Figure (3.1) plots the state-level tax burden against the firm-size wage gap estimates. The negative relationship is even sharper when we rule out the outliers that emerge in our regressions (Florida, Massachusetts, and Washington). This result roughly confirms the validity of our theoretical predictions. We interpret this finding as
follows. Each extra dollar offered by the firm is translated into less-than-a-dollar increase—due to taxes—in the wage offer received by the worker. This generates a downward pressure on the size premium in high-tax environments, while this pressure gets smaller as the tax rates decline. The informal job is the extreme case. As tax rates converge to zero, the firm-size wage gaps start increasing and, at the limit, it resembles the size premium in the informal job.

This finding suggests that labor-tax policy can affect how observationally equivalent workers fare in larger firms relative to smaller firms. In other words, we show that government policy can be a determinant of the magnitude of the firm-size wage gap and, therefore, the allocation of workers across firms of different sizes.

### 3.2.2 An Alternative Mechanism

In this part, we will show that our model can explain the stylized fact documented in Section 2 even when the tax dimension is shut down. Again, we assume that markets are segmented. Our starting point is the Equation (3.15), which is the main prediction of our benchmark model. The model predicts that two forces jointly generate the firm-size wage gaps: (i) larger firms pay higher wages since they are more productive (the productivity effect) and (ii) larger firms
expect to attract a larger number of applicants and the size of the applicant pool determines the size premium (the labor supply effect). The latter is a mitigating force; that is, when the pool of potential applicants is large, then the firm will tend to keep the size premium small.

Based on this prediction, the size gradient of equilibrium wages can be different between formal and informal jobs because of two reasons. First, it can be the case that formal jobs are more productive than informal jobs. In other words, given firm size, $g'(N)$ should be larger for formal jobs than informal jobs. However, we only have information about the formality status of the job, not the formality status of the firm. Informal jobs can be posted by formal firms and this is a common practice in Turkey. Without further evidence, asserting that formal jobs should be more productive than informal jobs may produce misleading results. Thus, we de-emphasize the potential differences in the productivity-effect channel.

The second reason is due to the potential differences in the size elasticity of the expected number of applicants. Larger firms offer higher wages (since they are more productive) than smaller firms. Higher wages, in turn, attract a larger number of applicants per job; thus, $d\mu_j/dN_j > 0$. However, the degree of this differential effect is potentially different between formal and informal jobs. Let $d_i$ and $d_f$ denote the magnitude of this differential effect $d\mu_j/dN_j > 0$ for informal and formal jobs, respectively. The stylized fact we report—that is, the firm-size wage gap is larger for informal employment than formal employment—implies that $d_i < d_f$, so that $dw_j/dN_j$ is larger for informal jobs than formal jobs. In other words, the implication that $d_i < d_f$ can itself explain why the firm-size wage gap is larger for informal employment.

What does $d_i < d_f$ say? It means that the mitigating effect—i.e., the labor supply effect, which operates as a negative force—is weaker for informal jobs. In other words, higher wage offers bring in a smaller number of additional applicants in informal jobs than formal jobs. So, the firm-size wage gap is larger for informal jobs even when the productivity effect is deactivated. This mechanism may be operating due to several reasons. First, larger firms, on average, may have greater skill requirements both for the formal and informal jobs they offer.
However, informal jobs with higher skill requirements may fail to attract a large number of applicants, since skilled workers are expected to opt for formal jobs. Second, information on job opportunities in informal jobs are most likely disseminated through informal job search networks (such as relatives, friends, neighbors, and other acquaintances) rather than formal channels (such as ads). This can potentially reduce the size of the applicant pool for informal jobs. Finally, applicants may be valuing other job-specific (pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary) amenities along with pay. This kind of amenity packages are weaker in informal jobs, by definition. This weakness may itself lead to a smaller applicant pool in informal jobs, if the weight assigned to these side amenities are high enough.

4 Concluding Remarks

It is well-documented in the literature that observationally equivalent workers receive higher wages in larger firms than smaller firms. In this paper, we report a new stylized fact using micro-level data from Turkey: the firm-size wage gap is larger for informal jobs than formal jobs.

We develop a game-theoretical model to provide a systematic explanation for this fact. The model offers two alternative explanations. First, it suggests that high tax burden on formal jobs is the reason. We provide some auxiliary empirical support for this prediction using state-level tax differentials in the U.S. This finding relates the magnitude of the firm-size wage gaps to government policy. And, second, it predicts that the number of new applicants that an incremental increase in posted wages attracts will be lower for informal jobs. This, alone, can explain why larger firms need to offer higher wages to fill their most productive informal vacancies than their formal vacancies. Although our empirical findings are quite robust to alternative specifications, more empirical research is needed to check the universal validity of the finding that the firm-size wage gaps are larger for informal jobs than formal jobs. This task can best be performed by analyzing micro-level datasets from other developing countries with a large share of informal jobs.
References


